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ABSTRACT

By
Ted Boettner
University of New Hampshire, September, 2009

Since the 1960s, neo-conservatives advanced their agenda through journals, think
tanks, coalitions, and by serving as high-level government officials. While scholars have
noted this influence, there's little written on how neo-conservative ideas have evolved
and influenced foreign policy under these changing historical circumstances. Moreover,
very little scholarship foils neo-conservatism against the two dominant approaches to
foreign policy in the 20th century - realism and liberalism - to discover how they are held
together as a group. This thesis finds that neo-conservatism is a political ideology of
American foreign policy that has developed several common tendencies over the last
forty years. These include an ardent belief in the use of unilateral American military
power, distain for multilateral institutions such as the United Nations, Wilsonian ideas of
spreading democracy, steadfast support for Israel, and overstated threat assessments.

vin

INTRODUCTION

What is Neo-conservatism?
Neo-conservatism is a somewhat contradictory set of ideas in domestic and
foreign policy. Whereas neo-conservatives embrace democracy promotion in debates
surrounding foreign policy, they tend to reject extending democracy in domestic affairs
because it can lead to a weak government that is ruled by passion rather than reason. For
this reason, among many others, neo-conservatism is difficult to distil into a single
political doctrine. Nevertheless, neo-conservatives do share some common attributes.
Neo-conservatives have an acute sense of the political, unlike neo-liberals who want to
minimize the role of politics as much as possible, and they believe in the projection of
American power across the globe to secure American interests and security and because
it is a unique regime with universal values.

Why is Neo-conservatism important?
In recent years, and especially following the events of September 11, 2001, neoconservatism has found itself at the center of debate in how America's foreign policy
decisions are being conceived and advanced. Because many neo-conservatives served as
high-level officials in the administration of president George W. Bush, speculation on the
influence of a neo-conservative foreign policy, particularly in the 2003 invasion of Iraq,
has increased.

1

The impact of neo-conservatism on U.S. foreign policy, however, has a history
longer than the invasion of Iraq. Since the 1970s, neo-conservatives have played an
important role in debates over American foreign policy by acting through organizations
such as the Committee on Present Danger, Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs
and the Project for the New American Century. They've occupied influential posts inside
the State and Defense Departments, as well as provided outside intellectual support
through think tanks, journals, newspapers and magazines.
During the George W. Bush administration the congruity between several of their
foreign and security policy prescriptions, especially toward deposing Saddam Hussein of
Iraq, and those implemented have been noted.1 This in turn has lead to a wide and stillgrowing debate on the influence of neo-conservatism in shaping U.S. foreign and security
policy in the post-Cold War period. This debate has also sparked more fundamental
questions regarding the nature and purpose of American power, the legitimacy of
preventive war and unilateralism, the usefulness of alliances and international law, and
others.
While many commentators and scholars have been quick to point out the
influence of neo-conservatism in recent foreign policy decisions, few have been able to
situate neo-conservatism fits as a body of work in U.S. foreign and security policy. The
reasons may be that neo-conservatives are not an easily identifiable group. There is no
organization, no membership, no founding document, and no consensus on who belongs
and who does not. Indeed, very few International Relations (IR) scholars have grappled

' Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clark, American Alone: The Neo-conservatives and the Global Order
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 201-231.
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with neo-conservatism as it relates to their own theories. One reason that neoconservatism has not become a major focus for IR study might be that neo-conservatives
do not generally write for academic journals (except for the occasional article in Foreign
Affairs and Foreign Policy) or encourage academic theoretical debate within the field of
IR. Moreover, the language of neo-conservatives is to a large extent highly politicized,
sometimes messianic, and value driven. These characteristics do not lend themselves well
to situating neo-conservatism within realism and liberalism, the two most influential
schools of thought in IR study.
The central aim of this thesis will be to delineate the key tenets of a neoconservative foreign policy ideology by looking at the specific ways neo-conservative
ideas have evolved and influenced foreign policy under changing historical
circumstances. After showing the historical influence of neo-conservatism in American
foreign policy, this paper will compare neo-conservatism to realism and liberalism. By
comparing neo-conservatism to these two schools of thought, it will explain the
similarities among and differences between the three groups and how best to categorize
neo-conservatism.
This thesis will seek to answer two questions:
1.

How does a set of neo-conservative ideas move over time to influence
American foreign policy?

2.

How does neo-conservatism compare to realism and liberalism, the two
leading schools of thought in international relations study?

2

See, for example, Mohammed Nuruzzaman, "Beyond the Realist Theories: "Neo-Conservative Realism"
and the American Invasion of Iraq," International Studies Perspectives, 2006 Vol.7, 239-253; Aaron
Rapport, "Unexpected Affinities? Neoconservatism's Place in IR Theory," Security Studies, Vol. 2, Issue 2,
2008, 257-293; and Michael C. Williams, "What is the National Interest? The Neo-conservative Challenge
in IR Theory," European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 11, Issue 3, 2005, 307-337.
3

The paper will proceed along three lines. Chapters One and Two provide the
necessary background information in order to put neo-conservatism into context and to
draw conclusions in the final chapter. Chapter One identifies the major ideas of neoconservatism in the words of neo-conservatives, looking at neo-conservatism as it relates
to both domestic and foreign policy. Chapters Two, Three and Four will show the
progression of neo-conservatism and foreign policy from its roots in the Ford and Reagan
administrations to the administration of George W. Bush. This analysis will show how
neo-conservatives are held together in terms of their views on foreign policy strategy and
how they've formulated their ideological assumptions and explanations of America's
place in international politics.
Chapter Two looks at the roots of neo-conservatism and its reaction to detente in
the 1970s. Specifically, it will examine the neo-conservatives associated with Senator
Henry "Scoop" Jackson and nuclear strategist Albert Wohlstetter and how they
participated in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I and II) in the 1970s. This
chapter also focuses on neo-conservative policies espoused in the 1980s, their influence
on the Reagan administration, and the formation of the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance
(DSG) document, which many see as the first articulation of a post-Cold War foreign
policy position.
Chapter Three examines neo-conservative post-Cold War foreign policies during
the 1990s. This chapter pays special attention to neo-conservative criticisms of the
Clinton administration's foreign policy regarding multilateralism and Iraq. Chapter Four
explores the link between the high-level officials in the administration of George W.

4

Bush and their influence on the National Security Strategy of 2002 (Bush Doctrine) and
the arguments made in favor of invading Iraq.
In order to arrive at meaningful characterization of neo-conservatism, Chapter
Five examines the realist and liberal strains in US foreign policy thinking and practice
over the 20th century. The chapter begins with a brief description of how an IR theory is
different from a political ideology aimed at political action. This chapter also examines
realism and liberalism by looking at the history, theories and practices of both schools of
thought. The last part of this thesis, the conclusion, will transmit the findings of the five
previous chapters in order to answer the two research questions above.

5

CHAPTER 1

NEO-CONSERVATIVES ON NEO-CONSERVATISM

Who are the neo-conservatives and how do they describe themselves? Columnist David
Brooks writes: "If you ever read a sentence that starts with 'Neocons believe,' there is a
99.44% chance everything else in that sentence will be untrue." Seymour Martin Lipset,
who was one of the first intellectuals to be described as a neo-conservative, remarked
that:
Neoconservatism, both as an ideological term and as a
political grouping, is one of the most misunderstood
concepts in the political lexicon. The reason is simple, the
word has never referred to a set of doctrines to which a
given group of adherents subscribed. Rather, it was
invented as an invidious label to undermine political
opponents, most of whom have been unhappy with being so
described.3
Similarly, James Q. Wilson concluded in 1996 that neo-conservatism isn't an ideology
with a "systematic worldview that seeks to explain and evaluate the world...or a
movement and never will be."4 Wilson maintains that neo-conservatism is a "tendency of
American political thought" and an "intellectual impulse" that adheres to the "Law of
Unintended Consequences" by not opposing change within government, as a "true

3

James Q Wilson, Forward to The Essential Neoconservative Reader by Mark Gerson (Reading,
Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company; 1996), xiii.
4

Wilson, The Essential Neoconservative Reader, vii-x.
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conservative" would do, but questioning it "cautiously, experimentally, and with a
minimum of bureaucratic authority.5
As a group, neo-conservatives are less likely to write books, and more likely to
write articles in a number of publications, especially magazines. According to neoconservative Mark Gerson:
What about books? Yes, the neoconservatives have written books, but as
the first serious analyst of neoconservatism, Peter Steinfels, noted, "the
geography of the intellectuals' world is a geography of journals." Irving
Kristol, for instance, has never written a full-length book - his four books
are collections of essays. And almost always, neoconservatives' books are
based on essays they have previously published in their magazines.6
Irving Kristol is widely considered the "godfather" neo-conservatism. He is the founder
or editor of many influential magazines, including the CIA-funded Encounter,
Commentary, The Public Interest, and The Reporter. Through these publications, neoconservatives define their views and attempt to influence policy and debate. The Weekly
Standard, published by Kristol's son, William, is one of the leading publications in the
Beltway, and is hand-delivered to every member of Congress and every committee staff
member on Capitol Hill. It has a total circulation of 65,000.
Irving Kristol credits Michael Harrington with creating the term neo-conservative.7
According to Kristol, it was originally used to characterize the Shachtmanite Trotskyites
who voted for Nixon in 1972 in support of the Vietnam War. Kristol embraces the term,

5

Wilson

6

Mark Gerson, The Neoconservative Vision (Lanham: Madison Books, 1996), 5

7

Irving Kristol, Reflections of a Neoconservative (New York: Basic Books, 1983) , xi.

8

Gary Dorrien, "Michael Harrington: Socialist to the End," The Christian Century, 11 October 2000, 10021009
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calling himself a "true, self-confessed - perhaps the only - 'neoconservative.'"9 In 1979,
Kristol defined neo-conservatism as
... a current of thought emerging out of the academic intellectual world
and provoked by disillusionment with contemporary liberalism. Its
relation to the business community is loose and uneasy, though not
necessarily unfriendly.10
Kristol distinguishes neo-conservatism from modern conservatism in terms of the latter's
identification with the interests of the corporation, Wilson echoes these sentiments:
I don't feel very comfortable before business audiences because I know
that in many ways they are part of the problem. Given a large government
they will attempt to seize control of some of its parts to use for their own
advantage."
In terms of neo-conservatism and capitalism, Kristol writes that:
The attitude of neoconservatives to bourgeois society and the bourgeois
ethos is one of detached attachment. Neoconservatives do not think that
liberal-democratic capitalism is the best of all imaginable worlds - only
the best, under the circumstances, of all possible worlds.12
In his 1978 book Two Cheers for Capitalism, Kristol acknowledges that capitalism can
have anti-conservative effects, as the drive for money can undermine the stability of
families and neighborhoods. This is why Kristol gives capitalism only two cheers, instead
of the traditional three customary for unconditional approval. On economics, he writes
Neoconservatism is inclined to the belief that a predominantly market
economy is a necessary if not sufficient precondition for a liberal society.
It also sees a market economy as favorable to economic growth.
9

Kristol, Reflections of a Neoconservative, 73.

10

Kristol, 75-76.

11

Wilson, James Q, "Neoconservatism: Pro and Con," Partisan Review, Summer 1980, 510.

12

Kristol,76.
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Neoconservatives believe in the importance of economic growth because
they see economic growth as indispensable for social and political
stability.13
Kristol also explains how neo-conservatism differs from its former liberal roots:
Unlike previous such currents of thought, neoconservatism is antiromantic in substance and temperament. Indeed, it regards political
romanticism and its twin, political utopianism - of any kind as one of the
plagues of our age.14
Paradoxically, some critics consider neo-conservatism as "utopian" in its foreign policy
goals to spread of freedom and democracy in the world.
The philosophical origins of neo-conservatism, according to Krjstol, come from the
political philosophy of University of Chicago professor Leo Strauss:
The philosophical roots of modern neoconservatism are to be found
mainly in classical political philosophy. Here the teaching and writing of
Leo Strauss are of importance, though many neoconservatives find
themselves somewhat too wary of modernity.15
Strauss himself is wary of modernity, according to Shadia Drury, seeing it as the soul of
American society. "Deprive her of it and you might cut out her soul, and
destroy her very being." America's "love affair with modernity," according to Strauss, is
bound to end in disaster.16
Kristol chides liberalism for having inverted priorities in its attention to the market
and capitalism and the lack of attention it pays to moral virtue:

13

Kristol

14

Wilson, "Neoconservatism: Pro and Con"

15

Kristol, 75

16

Shadia Drury, Leo Strauss and the Politics of the American Right (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997),
14.
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Neoconservatives are not libertarian in any sense. A conservative welfare
state is perfectly consistent with the neoconservative perspective.
Neoconservatives believe that it is natural for people to want thenpreferences to be elevated. The current version of liberalism, which
prescribes massive government intervention in the marketplace but an
absolute laissez-faire attitude towards manners and morals, strikes
neoconservatives as representing a bizarre inversion of priorities.17
As Kristol shows, he is not entirely opposed to a welfare state of some kind, which is
often considered anathema to the conservative political philosophy of self-reliance and
personal responsibility. But he is opposed to the government not playing an active role in
regulating the morality of society. In his essay "Pornography, Obscenity, and the Case for
Censorship," Kristol expresses his disgust for what he sees as the moral decay of society:
They wanted a world in which Desire under the Elms could be produced,
or Ulysses published, without interference from philistine busybodies
holding public office. They have got that, of course; but they have also got
a world in which homosexual rape takes place on the stage, in which the
public flocks during lunch hours to witness varieties of professional
fornication, in which Times Square has become little more than a hideous
market for the sale and distribution of printed filth that panders to all
known sexual perversions.18
Liberalism, Kristol feels, has lost track of its moral bearings.
Neoconservatives look upon family and religion as indispensable pillars of
a decent society. Indeed, they have a special fondness for all of those
intermediate institutions of a liberal society which reconcile the need for
community with the desire for liberty.1
Neo-conservatives, on the other hands, have a common alliance with religious
conservatives.
17

Kristol,77.

18

Kristol,44.

19

Kristol,77.
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The steady decline in our democratic culture, sinking to new levels of
vulgarity, does unite neocons with traditional conservatives—though not
with those libertarian conservatives who are conservative in economics
but unmindful of the culture. The upshot is a quite unexpected alliance
between neocons, who include a fair proportion of secular intellectuals,
and religious traditionalists.20
The biggest influence of neo-conservatism on modern American policy is in the
area of foreign policy. According to neo-conservative scholar Max Boot: "It is not really
domestic policy that defines neo-conservatism. This was a movement founded on foreign
policy, and it is still here that neo-conservatism carries the greatest meaning, even if its
original raison d'etre - opposition to communism - has disappeared."21 Since Ronald
Reagan and following a hiatus during the Clinton years, neo-conservative foreign policy
has taken its place front and center on the world stage.
In the summer of 1996, William Kristol and neo-conservative scholar Robert Kagan
wrote an article in Foreign Affairs titled "Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy." It
was a neo-conservative call-to-arms, outlining the aims and goals of a neo-conservative
foreign policy and deriding the "muddled" Clinton-era policies and the conservative
"realism of Henry Kissinger."
In foreign policy, conservatives are adrift. They disdain the Wilsonian
multilateralism of the Clinton administration; they are tempted by, but so
far have resisted, the neo-isolationism of Patrick Buchanan; for now, they
lean uncertainly on some version of the conservative "realism" of Henry
Kissinger and his disciples.
Max Boot, six years later, echoes the words of Kristol and Kagan, calling attention to the
Irving Kristol "The Neoconservative Persuasion," in The Neocon Reader, edited by Irvin Stetzer (New
York: Grove Press 2004),35
21

Max Boot, "What the Heck is a Neocon?" Wall Street Journal, 30 December 2002

22

William Kristol and Robert Kagan, "Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, No. 4
1996,18
11

difference between a neo-conservative and conservative foreign policy:
One group of conservatives believes that we should use armed force only
to defend our vital national interests, narrowly defined... The idea of
bringing democracy to the Middle East they denounce as a mad, hubristic
dream likely to backfire with tragic consequences. This view, which goes
under the somewhat self-congratulatory moniker of "realism," is
championed by foreign-policy mandarins like Henry Kissinger, Brent
Scowcroft and James Baker III.23

Boot writes that neo-conservatives, including Dick Cheney and Paul Wolfowitz, feel that
"we need to promote our values, for the simple reason that liberal democracies rarely
fight one another, sponsor terrorism, or use weapons of mass destruction."24 Kristol and
Kagan define neo-conservative strategy in broader terms, claiming the overall role of
America should be one of "benevolent global hegemony:"
Having defeated the "evil empire," the United States enjoys strategic and
ideological predominance. The first objective of U.S. foreign policy
should be to preserve and enhance that predominance by strengthening
America's security, supporting its friends, advancing its interests, and
standing up for its principles around the world.25

Joshua Muravchik describes neo-conservatism as an approach to foreign policy that is
very different from realism and liberalism:
Neoconservatives were originally a circle of writers who proclaimed no
"ism." Their approach to foreign policy consisted of what Max Boot has
called "hard Wilsonianism." As one such neocon, I would stipulate that
the essential tenets, in contradiction to realism, include giving a greater
weight to moral considerations, attributing a larger importance to the
ideological element of politics and above all favoring a more contingent
assessment of the national interest. While realists believe that we will be
safer by seeking to avoid unnecessary broils, neocons believe that we will
Boot, "What the Heck is a Neocon?"
Boot
Kristol and Kagan, "Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy," 20.
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find more safety using our power to try to fashion a more benign world
order. On these points, neocons are liberal internationalists. Where they
part company from liberals is in a greater readiness to resort to force and a
lesser appreciation for the United Nations.26
As a final note, one of the leading practitioners of modern day neo-conservatism, Richard
Perle, denied the existence of a neo-conservative foreign policy. Speaking at the Nixon
Center in February 2009, Perle said: ""There is no such thing as a neo-conservative
foreign policy," adding that "50 million conspiracy theorists have it wrong."27 When
former Reagan official Richard Burt asked Perle if he thought that there was a neoconservative school of thought, Perle answered "not at all."
Notwithstanding Perle's assertion, this paper will illustrate that neo-conservatives,
including many that inhabited powerful positions within the administration of George W.
Bush, are an identifiable group with a long history of influencing American foreign
policy.

26

Joshua Muravchik and Stephan Walt, "The Neocons vs. The Realists," National Interest Online, 3
September 2008.

27

Dana Milibank, "Prince of Darkness Denies Own Existence," Washington Post, 20 February 2009.
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CHAPTER 2

THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEO-CONSERVATISM

The next three chapters describe the key tenets of neo-conservatism by exploring
its origins, philosophical foundations, and its foreign policy positions from the early
1970s to 2003. This chapter will begin by looking at the formation of neo-conservatism
and its intellectual roots. The second part of this chapter will explore how the neoconservatives first began influencing foreign policy during the Ford Administration,
including a discussion of their position against detente and in favor of "roll back" during
1970s and 1980s. Chapter Four looks at how neo-conservatism changed during the postCold War period. Chapter Five explores how neo-conservatives moved into positions of
power and influenced the Bush Doctrine and the U.S. decision to invade Iraq in 2003.
The following three chapters will demonstrate that neo-conservatism, unlike
realism and liberalism, developed not as a coherent political theory but as a political
ideology and strategy aimed at advocating hawkish foreign policies and overstating the
threats of U.S. adversaries. These chapters will focus on statements and positions
advanced made by the neo-conservatives and will pay considerable attention to Richard
Perle and Paul Wolfowitz. These two men are often cited as the two most prominent and
influential neo-conservatives. Both have been heavily involved in shaping foreign policy
over the past four decades.

14

The Formation of Neo-Conservatism

Although the neo-conservatives are prolific writers, few texts present a broad
outline of their core beliefs, central units of analysis, and epistemological and ontological
approaches to foreign policy strategy. Hence, acknowledged canonical texts, like Waltz's
Theories of International Politics or Keohane and Nye's Power and Interdependence are
in short supply.28 Similar to realists, the neo-conservatives tend to view themselves in a
"Hobbesian state of nature primitivism... where perpetual militarized competition for
ascendancy is the norm, . . . where trust among human beings is elusive... and
adversaries must be crushed."29 This view differs starkly from liberalism that bases it
ideas on the Enlightenment of the 18th Century that sees moderation and community
among nations as possible. Furthermore, neo-conservatives regard the potential of nonmilitary factors (global commerce, soft power, treaties, United Nations, etc.) as
constraints upon American power and prestige. Neo-conservatives also have a strong
aversion to totalitarian regimes that dates back to their memories of the holocaust and the
rise of fascism in Europe. They tend to equate any regime in the post-war era that has any
socialist or communist tendencies as one step away from turning into tyranny.
The neo-conservatives aversion to Enlightenment values and beliefs is attributed
to the political teachings and neo-platonic ideas of University of Chicago professor Leo
Strauss.30 Strauss' approach to philosophy was unique in that it longed for the religious

28

Halper and Clark, America Alone, 10.

29

Halper and Clark, 12.

30

Please see the following: Shadia B. Drury, Leo Strauss and the American Right (New York; Palgrave
Macmillian, 1997); Anne Norton, Leo Strauss: The Politics of American Empire (New Haven; Yale
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and moral clarity of the Ancien Regime, the pre-modern era, and that it rejected historical
relativism and democratic ideals.31 Some writers have linked Strauss' views - that the
public lacks the "fortitude to deal with truth" and that society needs "consoling lies" with the Iraq disinformation war campaign of 2002-3 by high-level planners in the
administration of George W. Bush.32 Political scientist Thomas G. West has argued that
Strauss and modern day neo-conservatives believe in "unilateralism" and hold contempt
for international institutions because they encroach upon U.S. sovereignty.33 Other
intellectual influences on neo-conservatism include Catholic theologian and realist
Reinhold Niebuhr and University of Chicago professor of political science and nuclear
strategist Albert Wohlstetter.
Neo-conservatism began in the anti-Stalinist left of the 1930s and 1940s in
journals like Commentary and The Public Interest. The founders of neo-conservatism
include political intellectuals Irving Kristol, Norman Podhoretz, Daniel Patrick
Moynihan, Michael Novak, Daniel Bell, Peter Berger, Midge Decter and Gertrude
Himmelfarb. This group is often referred to as the first generation of neo-conservatives,
as opposed to the second generation that came about in the 1980s. The first generation of
neo-conservatives included many socialists, social democrats, and Cold War liberals,
who supported both the strong anti-communism policy of Presidents Truman, Kennedy
and Johnson and the welfare state. However, in the late 1960s many neo-conservatives

University Press. 2004); Stephen Eric Bronner, 'Constructing Neo-Conservatism," Logos Journal, Spring
2004; and Michael Lind, "A Tragedy of Errors," The Nation, 23 February 2004, 23-32.
31

Phillip Green, "Neo-Cons and the Counter-Enlightenment," Logos Journal, Spring 2004.

32

William Pfaff, "The Long Reach of Leo Strauss," International Herald Tribune, 15 May 2003.
Thomas G. West, "Leo Strauss and American Foreign Policy," The Claremont Institute, 12 July 2004.
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found themselves at odds with the new social and political currents that were emerging,
especially the counter-culture. As they held on to their belief in an anti-communism and
a liberal interventionist foreign policy (Cold War liberal consensus), they departed from
the left and moved to the right. This led the neo-conservatives to abandon many of the
principles of liberalism and politically realign themselves. Irving Kristol defined a neoconservative during this time as "a liberal who had been mugged by reality."34
With the breakdown of the pre-Vietnam foreign policy consensus, intermediary
institutions began playing a larger role in developing foreign policy and giving the neoconservatives the opportunity to challenge the status quo. In the past, the voice of foreign
policy was the Council on Foreign Relations and its journal Foreign Affairs, but since the
1970s dozens of think tanks have become increasingly concerned with foreign policy.
This created a new trend toward more ideological driven advisory institutions and
decreased the role of universities in foreign policymaking. The neo-conservatives have
been leaders of this trend and can be found at many research institutions: Norman
Podhoretz and Meyrav Wurmser at the Hudson Institute, Max Boot at the Council on
Foreign Relations; and any member of the Project for the New American Century and
most foreign policy analysts at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI).35 Other research
institutions that feature neo-conservatives are the Olin and Heritage Foundation.
More recently, in the George W. Bush Administration, many neo-conservatives
held a variety of key positions in U.S. government. At this time, they also peddled their
34

Gerson, The Neoconservative Vision, 126.

35
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ideas in media, academia, and advisory boards. Prominent neo-conservatives in the
media include: Washington Post columnist Charles Krauthammer; Weekly Standard
editor and founder William Kristol; National Interest founder and former editor Irving
Kristol, father of William Kristol; and many foreign policy editorialists of the Wall Street
Journal, The New Republic, Commentary, The Public Interest, The American Spectator
and Fox News Channel. In the academy, Princeton professors Bernard Lewis and Aaron
Friedberg, Pepperdine professor James Q. Wilson, and Yale professor Donald Kagan
have all played roles buttressing neo-conservative ideas, opinions and policies. Neoconservatives also have modest outposts within the Hoover Institution at Stanford
University and at the University of Chicago.
The Ford Administration and the End of Detente
During the 1950s and 1960s, neo-conservatives tended to operate as public
intellectuals, commentators and academics, but neo-conservatives in the 1970s began
transitioning themselves to gain political power by becoming high-level government
officials. One of the first neo-conservative strategies to influence foreign policy began in
reaction to Richard Nixon's policy of improving relations with the Soviet Union, also
known as detente. Finding themselves skeptically regarded by both the traditional
conservatives and by the anti-Vietnam War wing of the Democratic Party, many neoconservatives attached themselves to 1972 presidential candidate Senator Henry "Scoop"
Jackson. Jackson was considered a fierce critic of detente and the SALT (Strategic Arms
and Limitation Treaties) agreements that increased armament control between the United
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States and the Soviet Union. Jackson was also a strong advocate of increased military
spending and a staunch supporter of Israel.
Neo-conservatives Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz both served as aides to
Senator Jackson in the 1970s. Other neo-conservatives that worked for Jackson include
Elliot Abrams, Douglas Feith and Abram Shulsky. During his time as aide to Jackson,
Perle played a large role in stifling any new arms control agreement between the U.S. and
the Soviet Union. The New York Times referred to Perle as a "central figure in the
developing debate... over the terms of a new arms control agreement being put together
by Soviet and American negotiators."37 During this time, Perle began to establish himself
as a leading figure in foreign policy strategy coordination despite not being a scholar of
international affairs. Jackson referred to Perle has "an outstanding professional, without a
doubt one of the best in his particular field of strategic doctrine and policy."38 During the
1976 presidential election, Perle also served as Jackson's national security advisor and
was described as an "adroit political operator" during the campaign.39 Perle came under
fire in 1978 when he worked for Jackson and was asked to resign after receiving topsecret C.I.A. reports on strategic arms limitation talks.40 Perle did not resign.
In 1972, Jackson and many of his neo-conservative fellow travelers founded the
Coalition for a Democratic Majority to "unite Humphrey and Jackson supporters" and
bring back the "great traditions" of the Democratic Party to advocate a tougher stance
37
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toward communism. The Coalition for a Democratic Majority became the template for
many groups that would follow in the years ahead. The two central points of agreement
that brought neo-conservatives together was their "staunch defense of Israel and a
depiction of detente as a failure . . . to stand up to the evils of communism."42 Neoconservatives such as Moynihan and Podhoretz began a sharp criticism of detente and the
second strategic nuclear arms treaty with the Soviet Union, SALT II.43
When Gerald Ford was elected president in 1974, many neo-conservatives and
foreign policy hawks began taking aim at the foreign policies of Ford's secretary of state
Henry Kissinger and his advancements of detente. When CIA Director George H.W.
Bush commissioned a small group of experts - called Team B (which included Paul Nitze
and neo-conservatives Richard Pipes and Paul Wolfowitz) - to seek an alternative
analysis of the C.I.A.'s National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), their data and conclusions
confirmed many of the perceived doubts neo-conservatives and Paul Nitze had about
detente and arms control. These doubts included that the NIE underestimated the threat
posed by Soviet strategic weapons programs and that the Soviet Union did not adhere to
the doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD).
The beginnings of Team B stem from the work of Albert Wohlstetter, who was a
nuclear strategic theorist and a professor at the University of Chicago. Both Perle and
Wolfowitz were proteges of Wohlstetter and credit him with much of their strategic
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thinking.

In 1974, Wohlstetter wrote an article in Foreign Affairs entitled "Is There a

Strategic Arms Race" that concluded the U.S. was allowing the Soviet Union to achieve
military superiority by not closing the missile gap.45 This began a series of attacks from
conservatives and neo-conservatives inside and outside of government on the C.I.A.'s
annual assessment of the Soviet threat.
In 1972, Wolfowitz took a job with U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
where he helped advise Team B. Wolfowitz got the job, according to historian James
Mann, due to the efforts of Jackson and Albert Wohlstetter.46 Team B concluded that the
National Intelligence Estimate on the Soviet Union, which was generated yearly by the
C.I.A., underestimated Soviet military power and misinterpreted Soviet strategic
intentions. Team B reports soon became the intellectual foundation for the idea of "the
window of vulnerability" and the massive arms buildup that began under the Carter
administration and accelerated under President Reagan.4T
Team B has been heavily criticized for being inaccurate and hawkish. Anne Cahn,
who was chief of the Social Impact Staff at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
(ACDA), later concluded: "If you go through most of Team B's specific allegations about
weapons systems, and you just examine them one by one, they were all wrong."
According to John Prados, the "experts" that formed Team B were all "conservative cold
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warriors determined to bury detente and the SALT process.'

Paul Warnke, an official

with a the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency at the time of the Team B exercise,
wrote: "Whatever might be said for evaluation of strategic capabilities by a group of
outside experts, the impracticality of achieving useful results by 'independent' analysis of
strategic objectives should have been self-evident. Moreover, the futility of the Team B
enterprise was assured by the selection of the panel's members. Rather than including a
diversity of views ... the Strategic Objectives Panel was composed entirely of individuals
who made careers out of viewing the Soviet menace with alarm."50
On the heels of forming Team B, Paul Nitze and many other prominent neoconservatives -

including Norman Podhoretz, Perle Jeanne Kirkpatrick, Max

Kampelman, Seymore Martin Lipset, Bayard Rustin, and Medge Decter - reconstituted
the Committee on Present Danger (CPD) to alert the public of the growing Soviet
Threat.51 As Jason Vest makes clear:
[The] neoconservative hawks found an effective vehicle for advocating
their views via the Committee on the Present Danger, a group that
fervently believed the United States was a hair away from being militarily
surpassed by the Soviet Union, and whose raison d'etre was strident
advocacy of bigger military budgets, near-fanatical opposition to any form
of arms control and zealous championing of a Likudnik Israel.52
The CPD was first formed in 1950 during the Korean War as a "citizens lobby" to alert
the nation of the growing Soviet threat to the United States. Twenty-four years later, it
was reconstituted to counter the perceived dangers of detente. Its members were
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identified as "hawkish cold warriors" or "representatives of the military-industrial (or
intellectual) complex."53 Reflecting on the influence of the CPD during the 1970s, neoconservative Max Kampelman wrote, " I know of no private public affairs organization
that has had a greater influence in such a short period of time on U.S. foreign and defense
policy issues."54
Approximately 33 officials in the Reagan administration, including Perle and
Wolfowitz, were associated with the CPD. In fact, Ronald Reagan himself had been a
member of the CPD in the 1970s. This explains, in part, how many of the neoconservatives found positions in his administration. The CPD was dissolved in 1981 but
was resurrected in 2004 to address the "war on terrorism" during the George W. Bush
administration. The board members of the new CPD include many prominent neoconservative figures such as John Bolton, Douglas Feith, Michael Ledeen, Paul
Wolfowitz, and James Woolsey. According to its founder, former Reagan advisor Peter
Hannaford, the new CPD was formed because a parallel existed between the Soviet threat
and the threat from terrorism.55
The 1970s would also see the formation of the Jewish Institute for National
Security Affairs (JINSA), which was founded by Irving Kristol as a "counter balance to
liberal sniping at defense spending" and "focused on defense of American policies
concerning Israel."56 As Clark and Halper conclude, "commitment to Israel's security and
right to exist and a patriotic support of American values were inextricably linked in the
53
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eyes of many neo-conservatives." "Neoconservatives concerned that the United States
might not be able to provide Israel with adequate military supplies in the event of another
Arab-Israeli war" prompted JINSA's founding, according to Jason Vest.58
The work of Team B, CPD and JINSA played a influential role in ending detente
during the Ford and Carter administrations. These political lobbying organizations not
only helped pave the way for the large military build up during the Reagan
administration, but also helped many neo-conservatives find new posts in the new
administration.
The Reagan Administration and Soviet-American Arms Control
For many neo-conservatives, the administration of Ronald Reagan served as a
benchark. It highlighted their transition from public intellectuals dismayed over the
breakdown of the post-cold war consensus, to being realigned and part of administration
that once again shared foreign policy vision. For the neo-conservatives, the new
administration incorporated a framework of moral and religious clarity, higher defense
budgets, and a muscular and interventionist stance toward communism. Reagan's ability
to recognize communism as an "evil empire" embodied many of the same long-held
virtues that galvanized the neo-conservatives to end detente.
The neo-conservatives also believed the U.S. strategy toward the Soviet Union
should be offensive, rather than defensive. The neo-conservatives did not hold that the
strategy of mutual assured destruction (MAD) would keep American safe. They believed
Moscow was aiming to surpass Washington in an arms race and develop first strike
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capability. This led the neo-conservatives to advocate a policy of aggressive containment,
where the U.S. would contain the center (the Soviet Union and its Eastern European
satellites) and "roll back" any further expansion of the Soviet Union in the periphery (El
Salvador, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, etc). This strategy was partly adopted by the Reagan
administration and became known as the Reagan Doctrine, where the U.S. would fight
the Soviets by proxy on the periphery.
The neo-conservatives .held so many positions within the new administration that
the New Republic sardonically warned that it was being taken over by "Trotsky's
orphans."59 Richard Perle, who was the assistant secretary of defense for international
affairs in the Reagan administration, was known as the "prince of darkness" for his
hawkish stances toward the Soviet Union.60 Perle was also known as the Reagan
administrations "dominant arms control figure" and was a harsh critic of comprehensive
nuclear test bans between the United State and the Soviet Union.61 According to the New
York Times, Perle "dominated Administration policy on arms control," which "persuaded
president Reagan to repudiate the SALT II treaty" and "undermine the Antiballistic
Missile Treaty."62 At one point Perle went so far as to say that those who oppose the
administrations position on SALT II "are aligning themselves with the Soviet Union."63
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The central strategy that Perle championed was the zero option policy, which
called for the "removal of all Soviet SS-20s from Europe and Asia in return for
America's agreement not to deploy cruise missiles and Pershing Hs in Europe."64 This
strategy was used as a bluff, with the intention that the Soviets would never remove their
missiles in return for a promise not to install weapons that were not in production. In
short, the zero option policy was designed to fail. According to historian Gary Dorrien, "
Perle did not expect the Soviets to sign the agreements that damaged their strategic
position, the implication was that no agreement was conceivable."65
While Reagan wanted to increase defense spending so that the U.S. could
negotiate an arms-control agreement from a position of strength, some neo-conservatives
outside of the administration wanted this strategy to fail.6 Upon the adoption of the
Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, Frank Gaffney, a neo-conservative and Defense
Department official who worked on arms control, established the Center for Security
Policy to campaign against arms control.67 The divergence between Reagan and the neoconservatives was also evident in his policy toward both the Middle East and Poland. The
fact that Reagan decided to cultivate better ties with Saudi Arabia instead of establishing
U.S. ground forces in the region to protect Israel appalled neo-conservatives such as
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Podhoretz and Robert Tucker. When martial law was declared in Poland in 1983, neoconservatives wanted Reagan to use this opportunity to exacerbate the crisis and break up
the Soviet Union. Instead, Reagan favored stability to avoid provoking a harsh Soviet
reaction that could lead to a direct superpower confrontation.69
The 1980s also saw the placement of neo-conservative Paul Wolfowitz in several
positions within the Reagan administration, including the State Department's Director of
Planning, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and
Ambassador to the Republic of Indonesia. At the beginning of the Reagan administration,
Wolfowitz was in charge of recruiting a 25 member staff made up of several neoconservatives - including Francis Fukuyama and Zalamy Khalizad. Its charge was to
look at the long-term goals of redefining the administrations relations with the rest of the
world. Fukuyama and Khalized, who would later become influential in neo-conservative
post-Cold War strategy within the federal foreign policy bureaucracy, went to the same
schools as Wolfowitz. Fukuyama attended Cornell Univerity and Khalizad attended the
University of Chicago where he, like Wolfowitz, was a student of Albert Wohlstetter.70
During his time in the Reagan administration, Wolfowitz proved himself as a staunch
supporter for the state of Israel and that the U.S. did not need to reach accommodation
with the world's other super powers because America was strong enough without their
support. His perspective on China was a significant change in direction from the NixonKissinger diplomacy with China. It was also significant, according to Mann, because
68
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Wolfowitz's evolving perspective on China was "similar to his and other neoconservatives' view of detente with the Soviet Union in the 1970s."71 The Reagan
Administration agreed with Wolfowitz that the U.S was overvaluing its strategic position
with China and Secretary of State Shultz began to reorient administration policy toward
Asia by focusing more on relations with Japan.
In 1979, Jeanne Kirkpatrick developed a foreign policy strategy that became a
hallmark of neo-conservative realism in the 1980s, sometimes called the "Kirkpatrick
Doctrine." Kirkpatrick believed that there was a distinction between authoritative regimes
and totalitarian ones and that right wing dictatorships should be supported because they
provided a bulwark against the larger threat of the Soviet Union.72 Irving Kristol in
Commentary and Norman Podhoretz in The Public Interest frequently backed this line of
thinking. The proposition to support undemocratic regimes, like Pinochet in Chile, Chun
Doo Hwan in South Korea, Suharto in Indonesia, and Marcos in the Philippines, was very
influential in the early Reagan administration and among neo-conservatives. It was also
during this time that Midge Decter formed the Committee For the Free World, which
"served as a clearing house for neoconservative activists" dedicated to defending the free
world against the "rising menace of totalitarian barbarism."73 This committee enjoyed
regular correspondence with Kirkpatrick and assistant secretary of state for international
organizations and fellow neo-conservative Elliot Abrams, who was also a founding
member of the committee.
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As assistant secretary of state for East Asian and pacific affairs, Wolfowitz tried
to re-orient the administration's policy toward democracy promotion, stating in the Wall
Street Journal that "the best antidote to Communism is democracy."74 Wolfowitz, unlike
Kirkpatrick, believed in pursuing democracy promotion as a foreign policy strategy and
that the U.S. should oppose any leader who is a tyrant. This strategic and philosophical
difference illuminated the divisions within the neo-conservative ranks. According to
Mann, "Over the following decades the neoconservatives struggled to come to grips with
the antidemocratic implications of Kirkpatrick's article, sometimes defending it,
sometimes ignoring it."75
During the second Reagan administration, many neo-conservatives found the
arms negotiations with Mikhail Gorbachev appalling and a lowering of the guard. The
Soviet political and economic reforms, perestroika and glasnost, also clearly exposed the
fundamental flaws of the Kirkpatrick doctrine that held that totalitarian states were
immune to liberalizing tendencies. The neo-conservatives were also out of touch with
how these reforms were changing the Soviet Union's power in the world. As late as 1987,
Eugene Rostow was issuing grim warnings to policymakers about Soviet expansionism.
Rostow cautioned that Moscow was still "steadily building an alternative state system
based not on equilibrium but on Soviet dominance: a true Pax Sovietica." Richard Pipes
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and Michael Ledeen also made such out of place predictions.

In fact, in early 1989

during the first Bush Administration, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and his policy
chief Wolfowitz warned government officials that the Soviet Union still posed a big
threat to the United States only weeks before the fall of the Berlin Wall.78 After the fall of
the Eastern Bloc, Podhoretz, editor of Commentary and leading advocate neoconservative foreign policy during the Reagan years, simply stopped writing because his
views on the strength of the Soviet Union became anachronistic and misplaced. However,
most neo-conservatives later viewed the end of the Cold War as a win because of
Reagan's policy of "roll-back" and strident stand toward communism in all parts of the
world.
With the election of George H.W. Bush, few neo-conservatives found posts
within the new adminstration. The Bush administration was mostly made up of realists
like Brent Scowcroft, James Baker, and Lawrence Eagleburger. The only prominent neoconservative strategist who found a top-level post within the new administration would
be Wolfowitz, who served as under-secretary of defense.

The George H.W. Bush Administration and Defense Planning Guidance 1992

In 1992, toward the end of the George H. W. Bush Administration, the first neoconservative post-Cold War foreign policy strategy was written under the supervision of
Wolfowitz. The document entitled "Defense Planning Guidance (DPG-92)" was intended
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to highlight the need for more defense spending and to describe the new focus of the
United States military abroad in an "era of fundamental change."79 DPG-92 called for U.S.
foreign policy to shift to a focus on retaining its sole-superpower status, which it gained
with the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. It promoted the
establishment of "new order" as paramount to the new Pentagonframework,where the
Pentagon's role towards emerging powerful nations is to actively "discourage them from
challenging our leadership."80 DPG-92 also involved the work of two other neocdhservatives, I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, a protege and top assistant of Wolfowitz, and
Zalma Khalilzad, a longtime Wolfowitz aide.81
Laid out in the document were possible scenarios that could open up a road to war
by the end of the twentieth century, including the possible defense of Lithuania and
Poland from a Russian invasion following the end of the Cold War (in an effort to
consolidate Russian power in the region), wars against Iraq and North Korea in defense of
their southern neighbors (Kuwait and South Korea, respectively), and smaller-scale
interventions in Panama and the Philippines. Furthermore, the document weighed the
possibility of the United States military to "preempt or punish" the use of biological,
chemical, or nuclear weapons, "even in conflicts that otherwise do not directly engage US
interests."
The document called for the maintenance of U.S. military dominance capable of
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"deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role."
The document clearly states the emergence of a new global rival would be a detriment to
the "new order" it seeks:
Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival. This is a
dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy and
requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a
region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to
generate global power."83
This would include such energy-rich and globally important areas as the Middle East and
the new republics in Central Asia. Also mentioned was the "two-war" benchmark, where
the armed forces are told to be prepared for the ability to fight two large wars at all times,
and to purchase and have on-hand 80 percent of the conventional munitions required to
destroy 80 percent of expected targets "in the two most demanding Major Regional
Conflict scenarios." This would require massive military funding and a revolution in troop
preparation and deployment.84
The document was leaked to the New York Times and then, subsequently, to the
Washington Post and to Congress, where it drew the ire of several Congressmen. Senator
Joseph Biden, a Delaware Democrat, called the goals of the document "literally a Pax
Americana," claiming simply that "it won't work.. .and that you can be the world
superpower and still be unable to maintain peace throughout the world." Senator Robert
C. Byrd, a Democrat from West Virginia, called the document "myopic, shallow and
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disappointing," claiming "the basic thrust of the document seems to be this: We love
being the sole remaining superpower in the world and we want so much to remain that
way that we are willing to put at risk the basic health of our economy and well-being of
our people to do so."85 Also weighing in was Air Force Secretary Donald B. Rice, who
stated the document was simply a staff project about to be circulated for higher-level
review, and that it "could have benefited from that review."86
In May 1992, several months after the document was leaked to the press and
Congress, it was re-released after heavy editing, with most or all of the "unilateral talk"
edited out, in what the New York Times called a "striking change of tone."87 The new draft
claimed, "one of the primary tasks we face today in shaping the future is carrying
longstanding alliances into the new era, and turning old enmities into new cooperative
relationships."88 When it was leaked to the press, there was a strong backlash against
Wolfowitz, who attempted to distance himself from the document and Khalilzad.
Cheney, however, openly praised it, telling Khalilzad that he had "discovered a new
rationale for our role in the world."89 Fellow neo-conservative Charles Krauthammer
wrote an editorial column in the Washington Post praising the new Pentagon Strategy.90
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The underlying assumptions in DPG-92 that America needs to once again project
its military power onto the main stage and that the U.S. did not need collective security
because of its unparallel strength galvanized the neo-conservatives and many foreign
policy makers throughout the 1990s. DGP-92 aimed to fill the strategic vacuum created
by the end of the Cold War and served as a "bridge" transporting the next generation of
neo-conservatives from the end of detente to the beginning of a new post-Cold War
framework.
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CHAPTER 3

THE FRAMEWORK OF POST-COLD WAR FOREIGN POLICY

At the end of the Cold War, the big question among policymakers, academics, and
the foreign policy elite was what to do with the overwhelming power and global latitude
of the United States. While some policymakers were demanding a peace dividend, many
neo-conservatives began arguing for a more assertive American foreign policy. Echoing
the principles outlined in DPG-92, the neo-conservatives began advocating a new global
order based on a "unipolar" world where no nation would challenge the power, position
and prestige of the United States. It would be a foreign policy of Pax Americana that
defined America's role in the world as a "democratic crusade" seeking the
universalization of American values. This creed was strongly advocated among the
second generation of neo-conservatives, such as William Rristol, Charles Krauthammer,
Joshua Muravchik, and Francis Fukuyama. However, some of the first-generation
neoconservatives, including Jeanne Kirkpatrick and Peter Berger, disagreed with this
vision believing it was far too overreaching.91
In Irving Kristol's new foreign policy journal the National Interest, Francis
Fukuyama and Charles Krauthammer put forth two seminal essays that transitioned neoconservative foreign policy from the Cold War to the post-Cold War world. It would
depart from the neo-conservative Cold War absolutism against communism and move
toward a muscular and nationalistic Wilsonian liberalism. In Fukuyama's 1989 article
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"The End of History," he proclaimed the triumph of Western liberalism an end to "the
realm of ideas" and concluded that liberal democracy will be the final form of
government.92 These statements aroused much debate in and outside of academia. It also
set a tone for the way neo-conservatives would define their foreign policy rhetoric and
vision of democratic liberalism as a moral absolute.
In the following issue of the National Interest, Krauthammer's essay, "Universal
Dominion: Toward a Unipolar World," would argue that "America's purpose should be to
steer the world away from its coming multipolar future toward a qualitatively new
outcome—a unipolar world . . . [where] the advancement of democracy should become
the touchstone of a new ideological foreign policy."93 Krauthammer was one of the first
to recognize that the end of the Cold War created a new era of unipolarity for the U.S.
and by embracing democracy and unilateralism it would create a benevolent Pax
Americana that no longer needed a balance of power. On the heels of this article, neoconservative Joshua Murachik wrote his manifesto in 1991 called Exporting Democracy:
Fulfilling America's Destiny. Muravchik, similar to Krauthammer, argued that
"democracy is our [nation's] creed" and that U.S. foreign policy should secure a new
world order forged by Pax Americana.94
This new strategy was pivotal in shaping a foreign policy consensus among neoconservatives by providing a framework of "democratic realism." The presumptions that
multilateralism was impractical and not desired, that a "benevolent hegemony is good for
92

Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" National Interest, Summer 1998, 3.

93

Charles Krauthammer, "Universal Dominion: Toward a Unipolar World," National Interest, Winter
1989,48-49.

94

Joshua Muravchik, Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's Destiny, (Washington, DC: American
Enterprise Institute, 1991), 227.
36

a vast portion of the world's population," mirrored the moral clarity that many neoconservatives admired in Reagan's foreign policy.95 This new vision of an interventionist
unipolar America, however, put them at odds with the administration of George H.W.
Bush, who advocated a more realist aligned foreign policy, and Bill Clinton who sought a
multilateral interventionist foreign policy.
The Clinton Administration, Multilateralism, and Iraq
When William Jefferson Clinton was elected in 1992, almost all neoconservatives found themselves out of work. Instead of serving in the administration, the
neo-conservatives spent the last decade of the twentieth century criticizing many parts of
Clinton's foreign policy while devising their own grand strategy for America. The neoconservatives criticized Clinton's foreign policy on many grounds, including his
reluctance to use American military power, especially in regard to Iraq, and his adherence
to multilateralism. Using their criticism of Clinton the neo-conservatives began forming a
new advocacy coalition aimed at "rebuilding America's defenses" by increasing military
spending and by promoting America as a benevolent hegemonic power.
One of the earliest critics of Clinton's foreign policy was Wolfowitz. Reacting to
Clinton's first year in office, Wolfowitz wrote in Foreign Affairs that Clinton lacked a
well-designed set of foreign policy principles that defined the national interest.
Wolfowitz maintained that U.S. foreign policy should not hinge on multilateralism
because of America's unchallenged and enormous military strength.96 Another criticism
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Wolfowitz and other neo-conservatives leveled at Clinton's foreign policy was the
inability to get rid of Saddam Hussein.
During the last months of the Gulf War in 1991, Wolfowitz argued the U.S. should
have removed Saddam Hussein by "marching on Baghdad and occupying Iraq."97
Wolfowitz also accused Clinton of not actively removing Hussein from power and for
displaying "paralyzing ambivalence" toward the Iraqi opposition that was put forth in the
passage of the Iraq Liberation Act passed by Congress in 1996. If Clinton didn't take
active steps to remove Hussein from power, Wolfowtiz predicted that the U.S. would be
forced to overthrow his regime in the future when "he was armed with weapons of
unparalleled destructiveness." Wolfowtiz and fellow neo-conservative Zalmay Khalilzad,
who was assistant undersecretary of defense for policy planning in the first Bush
administration and worked under Wolfowtiz at the Pentagon, advocated that Clinton
needed "a comprehensive new strategy aimed at promoting a change of regime in
Baghdad," including military action. Perle and Robert Zoellick, who was a former
undersecretary of state in the Reagan administration and a fellow neo-conservative, both
agreed Clinton's foreign policy lacked a coherent foreign policy strategy and conceptual
framework. Perle maintained that Clinton's foreign policy was a "patchwork foreign
policy, with no strategy, no global vision." Zoellick described the Clinton
administration's foreign policy as a "roller coaster ride" that is "strategically incoherent
and tactically reactive."99
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Many neo-conservatives who had close links to Israel's right-wing Likud party also
were advocating for Clinton to remove Saddam from power. In 1996, Perle, Douglas
Feith and David Wurmser authored a commissioned report - A Clean Break: A Strategy
for Securing the Realm - to the newly elected Israeli politician Benjamin Netanyahu. The
report called for removing Saddam from power because "Iraq's future could affect the
strategic balance in the Middle East profoundly" and it called for an end to the Oslo
peace process. The report also called for "reestablishing the principle of preemption."100
The protection of Israel from radical Islam and the peace process were of paramount
importance to many neoconservatives, including Douglas Feith, Perle, Wolfowitz, David
Frum and historian Bernard Lewis.101
In another reaction to Clinton's foreign policy, two second generation neoconservatives, William Kristol and Robert Kagan, developed and advocated a new
foreign policy strategy that maintained Republicans needed to step away from both Henry
Kissinger's "realism" and Pat Buchanan's "neo-isolationsim," and avoid the
"multilateralism of the Clinton administration.102 Kristol and Kagan outlined this
manifesto in an article in Foreign Affairs entitled "Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign
Policy." They argued that conservatives were adrift in responding to Clinton's
multilateralism approach and that the American grand strategy should be one of
"benevolent global hegemony:"
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Having defeated the "evil empire," the United States enjoys strategic and
ideological predominance. The first objective of U.S. foreign policy
should be to preserve and enhance that predominance by strengthening
America's security, supporting its friends, advancing its interests, and
standing up for its principles around the world.
This was the clearest enumeration of a neo-conservative foreign policy since the drafting
oiDPG-92 and it incorporated many of the sentiments of Krauthammer and Fukuyama's
earlier articles in the National Interest. This neo-conservative call-to-arms argued that U.S.
foreign policy should have a distinct moral purpose, based on the understanding that "its
moral goals and its fundamental national interests are almost always in harmony."104
Moreover, that the first objective of U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War world
should be to use American primacy to strengthen America's security by standing up for
its principles around the world.
To Kagan and Kristol, the main threat to the world was America's unwillingness
and indifference to project U.S. power abroad:
In a world in which peace and American security depend on American
power and the will to use it, the main threat the United States faces now
and in the future is its own weakness. American hegemony is the only
reliable defense against a breakdown of peace and international order. The
appropriate goal of American foreign policy, therefore, is to preserve that
hegemony as far into the future as possible. To achieve this goal, the
United States needs a neo-Reaganite foreign policy of military supremacy
and moral confidence.105

In 1997, as a means to propel the "neo-Reaganite" foreign strategy to the forefront of
American political debate, the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) was
Kristol and Kagan
Kristol and Kagan
Kristol and Kagan
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founded by Kristol and Kagan. One of the group's founding documents claimed, "a
Reaganite policy of military strength and moral clarity may not be fashionable today. But
it is necessary if the United States is to build on the successes of this past century and to
ensure our security and our greatness in the next."106 PNAC served as an intermediary
vehicle for advocating ideas put forth by Kagan, Kristol and other neo-conservative
fellow travelers. PNAC was a 501 (c) 3 organization funded by the Bradley Foundation
and was housed in the same Washington, D.C. office building as the American Enterprise
Institute. PNAC was staffed by a number of second-generation neo-conservatives who
generated statements and open letter campaigns that gathered the signatures of elite
political actors. PNAC members included Perle, Wolfowitz, and future Vice President
Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. According to Halper and Clark,
the founding of PNAC marked a "complete generational transition" in neo-conservatism
that occurred somewhere "between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Bosnian
war:"
"By the later half of the 1990s, Kagan, William Kristol, Muravchik, Perle,
Wolfowitz ... had assumed the leadership roles that had long been held by
Nathan Glazer, Irving Kristol, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and Norman
Podhoretz. The younger neo-conservatives had filled a space left by the
increasing inability of older neo-conservative views to provide a sufficient
interpretative framework for the changing realities of international events
in the 1990s."107

Similar to the formation of the Committee on Present Danger (CPD) in 1976, the neoconservative members and signatories of PNAC saw Clintons' foreign policy as a weak
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War period.
One of the first advocacy actions taken by PNAC was a letter to President Clinton
criticizing his foreign policy strategy regarding Iraq. The January 1998 letter urged
Clinton to move from a policy of "containment" of Iraq toward military action to remove
Saddam Hussein from power:
Given the magnitude of the threat, the current policy, which depends for
its success upon the steadfastness of our coalition partners and upon the
cooperation of Saddam Hussein, is dangerously inadequate. The only
acceptable strategy is one that eliminates the possibility that Iraq will be
able to use or threaten to use weapons of mass destruction. In the near
term, this means a willingness to undertake military action as diplomacy is
clearly failing. In the long term, it means removing Saddam Hussein and
his regime from power. That now needs to become the aim of American
foreign policy.108
The letter was signed by many second-generation neo-conservatives, including Elliott
Abrams, Fukuyama, Wolfowitz, Kagan, Khalilzad, Kristol, Perle, Zoellick, and Peter
Rodman. Of its 18 signatories, 11 would serve in high-level positions during the George
W. Bush administration. PNAC followed up a few months later with an open letter to
Senate leader Trent Lott (R-MS) and Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich (R-GA),
arguing that the "only way to protect the United States and its allies from the threat of
weapons of mass destruction [is] to put in place policies that would lead to the removal of
Saddam and his regime from power."109
In September 2000, just in time for the election of George W. Bush as
Clinton's successor, PNAC published a white paper entitled Rebuilding America's
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Defenses. This document contained a very detailed plan for transforming the military into
a force capable of retaining U.S global hegemony throughout the new century. It was
based, in part, on DPG-92 according to its author Thomas Donnelly:
In broad terms, we saw the project as building upon the defense strategy
outlined by the Cheney Defense Department in the waning days of the
Bush Administration. The Defense Policy Guidance (DPG) drafted in the
early months of 1992 provided a blueprint for maintaining U.S.
preeminence, precluding the rise of a great power rival, and shaping the
international security order in line with American principles and
interests.110
Rebuilding America's Defenses also advocated large increases in military spending ($15
billion-$20 billion) and for the United States to take military control of the Gulf region
"even should Saddam pass from the scene."111 "The process of transformation," the plan
said, "is likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event—like a
new Pearl Harbor."112
By the end of the Clinton administration, and despite not holding any major highlevel positions within government, neo-conservatives had formed a concrete foreign
policy strategy and coalition that sought to radically change foreign policy as they did in
the early 1970s. However, it wasn't until the election of George W. Bush in 2000 that the
neo-conservatives would find themselves back in a position of influence and be able to
put their strategy into action at the first opportunity.

Thomas Donnelly, Rebuilding America's Defenses (Washington D.C.: Project for the New American
Century, 2000)
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CHAPTER 4

THE ASCENDANCY OF NEO-CONSERVATISM

The George W. Bush Administration
Before George W. Bush was elected in November of 2000, he promised a foreign
policy very different from the neo-conservative strategy of projecting American power
unilaterally to overthrow regimes and implement American moral values. During his
campaign, Bush promised a humble foreign policy. In a speech at the Reagan Presidential
Library in November 1999, he stated: "Let us not dominate others with our power."113 In
a presidential debate with Al Gore in 2000, Bush said, "I would be very careful about
using our troops as nation-builders."114 In a debate a week later, Bush stated "Our nation
stands alone right now in the world in terms of power, and that's why we've got to be
humble and yet project strength."115 When George W. Bush was officially elected to the
presidency in 2000, many neo-conservatives found themselves appointed to several key
positions within new administration despite their differing approach to American foreign
and security policy.
Vice President Dick Cheney, a PNAC signer and former secretary of defense under
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George H.W. Bush, played a pivotal role in the installation of neo-conservatives within
the new administration.116 Cheney served as head of the "presidential transition," the
period between the election in November and the accession to office in January. With the
help of Cheney and others, many associates of PNAC become became high-level
government officials, including Donald Rumsfeld (Secretary of Defense), Paul
Wolfowitz (Deputy Secretary of Defense), Douglas Feith (Undersecretary of Defense),
Elliot Abrams (National Security Council), Richard Perle (chair of Defense Policy
Board), and Robert Zoellick (U.S. Trade Representative). These appointments became
the critical bureaucratic precondition for how the neo-conservatives would influence
foreign policy under the new Bush administration, the most notable of which was the
U.S. invasion of Iraq War and the Bush Doctrine laid out in the National Security
Strategy of 2002.

9/11 and the Iraq War
In his classic study Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, John Kingdon
argues that political change can only happen when a "widow of opportunity" for that
change opens up. 117 A policy window appears, according to Kingdon, when there is a
crisis, a change in national mood or administration. On September 11, 2001 the neoconservatives found their "window of opportunity" when the United States was attacked
by 19 Al-Qaeda terrorists, causing the deaths of nearly 3,000 U.S. citizens. In the days
following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, neo-conservatives in power took advantage of the
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national crisis to advocate invading Iraq and radically transforming the central organizing
principles of foreign policy strategy. As neo-conservative and PNAC member Gary
Schmidt points out: "Without 9/11, Bush might have been wandering in a desert, in terms
of foreign policy. He might have been looking for a minimal foreign-policy voice so that
he could concentrate on domestic matters. So we [Neocons] might not have been in a
good position at all."
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 created a sea change in U.S. foreign
policy and struck at old fears of America's vulnerability. Secretary of State Colin Powell
remarked after September 11, "Not only is the Cold War over, the post-Cold War period
is also over."119 The magnitude of these events required a new foreign policy to respond
to the changing realities of a post-9/11 era and the neo-conservatives offered a clear and
coherent blueprint to engage the world more forcefully to combat terrorism.120 By linking
their long-term vision of invading Iraq (which they had been advocating for years) to the
broader "war on terrorism" and the crisis of September 11, the neo-conservatives pursued
"doctrinal coupling."121 The critical placement of neo-conservatives not only within the
Bush administration, but also within the Republican Party and conservative based groups
like the Christian Coalition facilitated the implementation of their foreign policy
• •
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terrorism" would play out in the internecine battles following September 11. According
to journalist Bob Woodward, as early as September 12, 2001, Rumsfeld "raised the
question of attacking Iraq. Why shouldn't we go against Iraq, not just al Qaeda? he asked.
Rumsfeld was speaking not only for himself when he raised the question. His deputy,
Paul D. Wolfowitz, was committed to a policy that would make Iraq a principle target of
the first round in the war on terrorism."123 Woodward further asserts, "The terrorist
attacks of September 11 gave the United States a new window to go after Hussein." On
September 12, 2001, Richard Clarke, the Bush administration's counter terrorism chief,
attended a White House meeting expecting to talk about the previous day's events and the
possibility of other attacks in the near future. He claims:
.. .instead I walked into a series of discussions about Iraq... I
realized.. .that Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz were going to take advantage of
this national tragedy to promote their agenda about Iraq. Since the
beginning of the administration, indeed well before, they had been pressing
for a war with Iraq.124
A few days after 9/11, PNAC would release another letter arguing "even if evidence does
not link Iraq directly to the attack, any strategy aiming at the eradication of terrorism and
its sponsors must include a determined effort to remove Saddam Hussein from power in
Iraq."125 During this period, neo-conservative writers began to urge regime change in Iraq
as part of a larger strategy to remake the Middle East.126
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While some in the State Department, such as Secretary of State Colin Powell and
his assistant Richard Armitage, were advocating containment of Iraq and a policy of
finding the terrorists responsible for 9/11, the neo-conservatives, with support from Vice
President Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, were pushing a broader
approach to the "war on terrorism." The strategy of connecting Iraq to the wider war on
terrorism became evident in President Bush's State of the Union address when he
designated Iraq as part of the "axis of evil" and stated U.S. policy would preemptively
deal with these three nations, including Iran and North Korea.127 Bush's speechwriter and
fellow neo-conservative David Frum coined the phrase "axis of evil."128 By framing the
policy in this fashion, the media couched the Iraq war debate as a moral and messianic
crusade of good versus evil that would find substantial domestic support among Christian
conservative groups.129 After the war began, Muravchik commented "the war in Iraq
grew out of Bush's neocon strategy."130
The Bush Doctrine
Perhaps the most apparent neo-conservative foreign policy strategy that mirrored
official Bush administration policy was in the September 2002 National Security Strategy
of the United States. This publication, along with speeches given by President Bush,
became known as the "Bush Doctrine." The primary justification for war against Iraq that
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was put forth by the Bush administration hinged on many of the core tenets of the 2002
National Security Strategy. Upon its release, neo-conservative Max Boot described the
strategy as a "quintessentially neo-conservative document," and Norman Podhoretz wrote
an article in September 2002 "In Praise of the Bush Doctrine."131
The Bush Doctrine consists of three core foreign policy strategies. First, that the
United States would no longer rely solely on "Cold War doctrines of containment and
deterrence," two core beliefs held by proponents of realism and to a lesser extent
liberalism. Instead, the United States would pursue a strategy of preemptive and
unilateral military action in order to "take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans and
confront the worst threats before they emerge."132 The strategy of acting preemptively
first emerged in the DPG-92 a decade earlier. The 2002 National Security Strategy
echoed this clearly:
The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction - and the more
compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves,
even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack.
To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United
States will, if necessary, act preemptively."
The preemptive use of military power included a willingness to "go it alone" or
unilaterally. The "United States... will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise
our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them
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from doing harm against our people and our country."
The inability of the United States to attain a United Nations Security Council
resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq showed it would be extremely difficult
to use preemptive military force via consensus. As shown in the previous chapter, neoconservatives have long argued the United States does not need to act multilaterally
because they are the "unipolar power."135 President Bush's announcement to pull out of
the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2001 illustrated another strong parallel between
official US policy and the neo-conservative belief against multilateralism.136
The second foreign policy strategy outlined in the Bush Doctrine consistent with
neo-conservative policy prescriptions is American primacy. In the final chapter of the
2002 National Security Strategy, entitled "Transform America's National Security
Institutions to Meet the Challenges and Opportunities of the Twenty-First Century," the
document states that one goal of US policy is to "dissuade future military
competition."137 The DPG-92 document also stated that the overriding goal of a postCold War policy should to be a unipolar power: "[Our new regional defense strategy]
requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose
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This is echoed again in Rebuilding America's Defenses, which states that the primary goal
of U.S. foreign policy should be to maintain sole-superpower status.139
The last neo-conservative foreign policy strategy contained in the Bush Doctrine is
democracy promotion. The 2002 National Security Strategy states that the unparalleled
U.S. position of primacy creates a "moment of opportunity to extend the benefits of
freedom across the globe... [the United States] will actively work to bring the hope of
democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world."140
Over the last two decades, many neo-conservatives promoted the idea that democracy
promotion should play a central part in American foreign policy. Writing in the National
Interest, Krauthammer believed that since communism was dead, the central principle of
American foreign policy should be "the work of democracy" and "democracy should
become the touchstone of a new ideological American foreign policy."141 Similar to
Krauthammer, neo-conservative Joshua Muravchik contended the U.S. should
"concentrate on continuing to spread democracy in a post-Communist World" and that
America should export democracy because it " is created; it does not just rise."142
In 2000 Bill Kristol and Robert Kagen emphasized that democracy promotion is a
"realistic" good use of military power:
To many the idea of America using its power to promote changes of
regime in nations ruled by dictators rings of utopianism. But in fact, it is
eminently realistic. There is something perverse in declaring the
impossibility of promoting democratic change abroad in light of the record
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of the past three decades. After we have already seen dictatorships toppled
by democratic forces in such unlikely places as the Philippines, Indonesia,
Chile, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Taiwan, and South Korea, how Utopian is it to
imagine a change of regime in a place like Iraq? ... With democratic
change sweeping the world at an unprecedented rate over the past thirty
years, is it "realist" to insist that no further victories can be won?143
Unlike traditional American conservative foreign policy, with its strong isolationist
emphasis and its desire to keep the U.S. free from foreign entanglements, the Bush
administration and the neo-conservatives promoted a reworking of Wilsonian liberalism
that aimed to create a world in the image of America - bringing other nations the benefits
of democracy and freedom. John Mearsheimer characterizes the neo-conservative Bush
doctrine as "Wilsonianism with teeth" because it has "an idealist strand and a power
strand: Wilsonianism provides the idealism, an emphasis on military power provides the
teeth."144
"Bandwagoning" As a Neo-Conservative Strategy
The neo-conservative strategy of democracy promotion was one of the driving
forces in providing a rationale for invading Iraq. The neo-conservatives hypothesized that
the forced democratization of Iraq would cause other countries in the Middle East to
"bandwagon" and transform the region into a place useful for American interests and
power. In the months leading up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Kagan and Kristol argued:
A devastating knockout blow against Saddam Hussein, followed by an
American-sponsored effort to rebuild Iraq and put it on the path toward
democratic governance would have a seismic impact on the Arab world143
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for the better.. .Once Iraq and Turkey - two of the most important Middle
Eastern powers - are both in the pro-Western camp, there is a reasonable
chance that smaller power might decide to jump on the bandwagon."145
While the term "bandwagoning" or "bandwagoning effect" is an IR theory146 contained
within realism, Kagan and Kristol are not engaging in a theoretical academic debate
about its merits.I4? Instead, put forth the "reverse domino theory," or the less familiar
"democratic domino theory," arguing that by invading Iraq a democratic government
could be implemented, which would help spread democracy and liberalism across the
Middle East and the Arab world.148 Similar to the "domino theory" invoked during the
Vietnam War, the neo-conservative strategy of bandwagoning fell short of empirical
reality. This may partially explain why their strategy did not lead (as of February 2009)
to the development of democratic regimes in Iran or North Korea.
In an article about the failings of the neo-conservative strategy to transform Iraq
into a democracy, former neo-conservative Francis Fukuyama wrote:
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Of all of the different views that have now come to be associated with
neoconservatives, the strangest one to me was the confidence that the
United States could transform Iraq into a Western-style democracy, and go
on from there to democratize the broader Middle East. It struck me as
strange precisely because these same neoconservatives had spent much of
the past generation warning-in The National Interest's former sister
publication, The Public Interest, for example—about the dangers of
ambitious social engineering, and how social planners could never control
behavior or deal with unanticipated consequences. If the United States
cannot eliminate poverty or raise test scores in Washington, D.C., how
does it expect to bring democracy to a part of the world that has
stubbornly resisted it and is virulently anti-American to boot?149
Fukuyama further lamented that the strategy and policy was not based on an historical
understanding of how regimes turn toward building democracies: "Possibility is not
likelihood, and good policy is not made by staking everything on a throw of the dice."1
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CHAPTER 5

THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: REALISM AND
LIBERALISM

Over the last two centuries, realism and liberalism played a powerful role in
shaping debate and advancing solutions to global security dilemmas. From the Cold War
to the "war on terror", these two schools of thought analyzed the international order and
suggested strategies for policymakers and world leaders about approaching foreign policy
decision-making. The study of international politics can often be seen as a protracted
competition and struggle between these two dominate traditions. Over the last several
decades, these two schools of thought have been directly challenged by neoconservatism.
This chapter will analyze these approaches by explicating their historical
beginnings, core beliefs and central units of analysis. It will also look at the instruments
both realism and liberalism identifies as the most important to resolve global conflict, and
how they differ with neo-conservatism.151 However, before this analysis can take place,
it's important to explore the competing definitions of what constitutes an IR theory and
how it is different from a political ideology such as neo-conservatism.
IR Theories vs. Political Ideologies
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In the field of IR study, theories are usually put forth by paradigms based on
scientific research program. For example, realism and liberalism are not just IR theories,
but contain within them a series of theories that are intellectually related and explanatory
in nature. According to John Vasquez, they "constitute a family of theories because the
share a paradigm."152 A paradigm can be defined as the "fundamental assumptions
scholars make about the world they are studying."153 IR theory, according to Vasquez, is
"a set of interrelated propositions purporting to explain behavior."154 Kenneth Waltz
defines IR theory as
a picture, mentally formed, of a bounded realm or domain of activity. A
theory depicts the organization of a realm and the connections among its
parts. The infinite materials of any realm can be organized in endlessly
different ways. Reality is complex; theory is simple. By simplification,
theories lay bare the essential elements in play and indicate necessary
relations of cause and interdependency—or suggest where to go to look
for them.155
Waltz suggests that theory is "an instrument to be used in attempting to explain a
circumscribed part of reality" and that there must be an interplay or interdependence of
theory and fact.156 Moreover, Waltz maintains that theories are to be judged by "the
fruitfulness of their research programs" and by what they claim to explain.157 Further,
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theory aims not to direct foreign policies of states, but to describe their expected
consequences. Stephan Walt identifies two basic criteria for judging an IR theory: (a) the
explanatory powers of a theory to account for developments within its field and (b) the
theory's internal fertility.158 According to Walt a theory is powerful if it can provide
explanations to anomalies or critical objections that arise and whether it can repair itself
over time to address changes in state behavior. IR theories are also based on a set of
assumptions and logic that guide all states, not just the United States.
An IR theory can also be defined more broadly as a coherent, conceptual
framework that is used to facilitate the understanding and explanation of events and
phenomena in world politics, as well as the analysis and informing of associated policies
and practices. Causal IR theories are generally mutually exclusive in nature and attempt
to explain casual relationships based on an informed set of assumptions. For example,
that A (independent variable) causes B (dependent variable), and under what conditions.
Further, an IR theory must be part of an academic scientific research program (paradigm)
and it must be explanatory in nature. An IR theory cannot be just a set of strategic policy
goals (prescriptive), it must explain a specific phenomenon taking place within world
politics (description). If it only provides the former, it is best characterized as a strategy.
A strategy is broadly defined as a "plan of action or policy designed to achieve a major or
overall aim," such as "military operations and movements."159 A strategist is someone
who is an expert in strategy. While realists and liberals both engage in offering strategic
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advice and policy prescriptions in publications and to government officials, their
construction of theoretical abstractions is an academic pursuit. Thus, in order for a
discipline to operate at a theoretical level, it must exhibit an acute sense of objectivism or
positivism.
Similar to an IR theory, a political ideology has both descriptive and normative
elements. However, a political ideology seeks policy change and is not fundamentally
based in empirical science (although it might gain many of its idea from the academy) it
is part of a broader movement. In Political Ideologies: An Introduction, Andrew
Haywood defined an ideology as "broad traditions of thought, which have evolved and
developed under pressure of changing historical circumstances and as a result of
argument and debate, and continue to do so."160 Political ideologies are also more elastic
than an IR theory. Haywood suggests that ideologies can just hang together:
Ideologies therefore comprise a set of interrelated, more of less coherent, ideas.
Some would say that they constitute 'systems of thought', but in the case of
ideologies like conservatism or fascism the ideas may simply 'hang together'
rather than have a systematic or coherent shape.161
Martin Seliger defines an ideology as "a set of ideas by which men posit, explain and
justify the ends and means of organized social action, irrespective of whether such action
aims to preserve, amend, uproot or rebuild a given social order."162 Both Seliger and
Haywood see ideology as a set of interrelated ideas that form some type of political
action of collective goals.
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In his groundbreaking work Ideology and Foreign Policy, diplomatic historian
Michael H. Hunt defines ideology even more loosely. According to Hunt, ideology as "an
interrelated set of convictions or assumptions that reduces the complexities of a particular
slice of reality to easily comprehensible terms and suggests appropriate ways of dealing
with reality."163 Political ideologies also act as "social glue" binding different groups of
people together with shared ideas, values, and assumptions. Ideologies are also "actionoriented," aiming to preserve a particular social order or drastically change it.164
While both ideologies and paradigms contain a set of coherent ideas and beliefs
that form an outlook for interpreting the world, they differ in many ways. For example,
IR paradigms operate almost exclusively within the academic world of social scientific
research. Political ideologies, on the other hand, glean ideas from social science but
function in the political world. This doesn't mean that realism and liberalism don't affect
political outcomes, but that their primary purpose is to interpret the world order through
empirical research and theory building and appraisal.

Realism & Neorealism: History, Theory and Practice
The realist school of thought can be traced as far back as the Greek historian
Thucydides and the political philosophy and writing of Niccolo Machevilli and Thomas
Hobbes.165 The principal founders of "classical realism" include diplomatic historian
E.H. Carr, theorist Hans Morganthau and theologian Reinhold Niebuhr. In general,
realism holds that "states, like human beings, have an innate desire to dominate others,
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which led them to fight wars."

This pessimistic view of human nature is one of the

cornerstones of early realism and continues to be a driving force in realist thought.
Scholars have suggested that the realist paradigm is a statues quo doctrine because
it usually defends great power relations and often speaks for the dominant and
representative elite in society.

Moreover, its predictive assumptions have been

described as a self-fulfilling prophecy because it studies the past to predict the future.
Realism and neorealism rests on a common set of intellectual presuppositions, which can
include the following: 1) states are the primary actors in world politics who attempt to
maximize their, expected utility by seeking power at all times; 2) states are motivated by
their national interest and self-preservation; 3) the international system is anarchic; 4)
conflict and stability usually arises from great power rivalry; 5) understanding
nationalism is a crucial aspect of how states behave; 6) and that morality in international
affairs doesn't occupy a prominent position in formulating policy decisions.168
The central actors for realists are states whose behavior and high autonomy
functions within an anarchic international environment, often described as a world of
states-as-billiard-balls.169 The main instruments associated with realism are economic
power, state diplomacy, and especially military power. The moral and ethical foundation
of realism is self-preservation: states must protect their citizens from harm at all costs.
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One major drawback of realism is that it fails to account for change in the international
system. Jack Donnelly holds that "realism emphasizes the constraints on politics imposed
by human nature and the absence of an international government. Together, they make,
international politics largely a realm of power and interest."17
Realism and neorealism have developed many concepts and theories to explain
international phenomena. George Kennen's famous Cold War foreign policy prescription
of "containment" was among one of the first realist concepts to be officially adopted by
U.S. policymakers. Its role was pivotal to policymakers throughout the Cold War as a
guiding bipartisan strategy on foreign policy. Another theory that's been important to
explaining state behavior (especially during the Cold War) is balance of power. It
maintains that rapid changes in power relations among states can lead to
counterbalancing actions and provoke war. The world is safest, according to this theory,
when the balancing process brings stability of relations among states. A weakness of this
theory is that it doesn't account for internal factors (religion, values, form of government)
and it's difficult to measure. Balance of power theory is the central concept behind
neorealism.
Contemporary debate in realist theory revolves around two distinct strands,
offensive and defensive. Offensive realism holds that anarchy in the international system
provides strong incentives for the expansion and maximization of state power. Eric Labs,
John Mearsheimer and Fareed Zakaria have argued this theory.172 In contrast to offensive
170
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realism, defensive realism holds that great power expansion sometimes is outweighed by
security dilemmas in the international system. Moreover, this theory predicts that states
pursue expansionist policies because their leaders mistakenly believe that aggression is
the only way to make their state secure. Therefore, a more moderate expansionism is
preferred because it provides more security. Kenneth Waltz, Robert Jervis, and Stephen
Van Evera have advanced this theory.173
During the Cold War, realism was one of the most dominant modes of theoretical
thought and practice in American foreign policy. Realism reigned high in foreign policy
decision making, according to Stephen Walt, because "it provided simple but powerful
explanations for war, alliances, imperialism, obstacles to cooperation, and other
international phenomena, and because its emphasis on competition was consistent with
the central features of the American-Soviet rivalry."174 Some of the more recent scholars
and practitioners of realism include George Kennan, former Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger, and former national security advisor Brent Scowcroft. Each was influential not
only in scholarship, but in the ability to directly influence U.S. foreign policy and create a
geopolitical Cold War framework. Realists have largely held that the Cold War was won
because of the U.S. commitment to containment, deterrence and realpolitik.
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During the 1990s, realists were principally concerned with the resurgence of overt
great power competition, such as the rise of China and Europe as rival powers.175 Many
scholars have observed that China's foreign policy during 1990s has been grounded in
realist ideas. According to Jack Snyder, "as China modernizes its economy...it behaves
in a way that realists understand well: developing its military slowly but surely as its
economic power grows, and avoiding a confrontation with superior U.S. forces."176 If
China increases its economic development, it will in time lead to an increase in military
strength, which will soon present a security problem for the United States. Mearsheimer
believes that if this happens, the United States should reenact the Cold War foreign
policy of containment that controlled the regional growth of the Soviet Union. This
approach still attracts attention in the Pentagon, especially during discussions of China's
growing capabilities and the occasional rift between the U.S. and European Union.
Prior to the Iraq war of 2003, many practitioners and theorists of realism signed a
petition rejecting what they called American hubris and demanded a return to realism.
This was followed by the formation of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy
(CRFP), whose aim was to reject the imperial posture of American power and return to a
modest and more pragmatic foreign policy. The signatories opposed the central thrust of
the Bush Doctrine and its first test, the war and occupation of Iraq. Members of this
group cover a somewhat wide political spectrum -from former Colorado Senator Gary
Hart to Scott McConnell, the executive editor of the American Conservative. Other
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members include influential realists John Mearsheimer, Jake Snyder, Kennth Waltz, and
Stephen Walt. Snyder maintains that although this group is diverse, its inspiration lies in
177

realist theory.
In an article in the National Interest in spring of 2003, Snyder argued that the
Bush administration's understanding of the balance of power theory in realism is
backward and is was being used in the place of "bandwagoning."178 "Administrative
strategists like to use the terminology of the balance of power, but they really understand
that concept exactly backwards," says Snyder.179 Snyder further maintains that balance of
power politics has nothing to do with expansionism: "In the international system, states
and other powerful actors tend to form alliances against the expansionalist state that most
threaten them. Attackers provoke fears that drive their potential victims to cooperate with
each other."180 Walt, for example, holds that by employing bandwagoning logic, the Bush
administration and the neo-conservatives incorrectly argued "that displays of power and
resolve by the United States will discourage further resistance and lead more and more
states to conclude that it is time to get on our side."181
In January 2003, Mearsheimer and Walt published "An Unnecessary War" in
Foreign Policy magazine refuting the neo-conservative arguments for going to war in
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Iraq.182 This article laid out the realist case against the Iraq war by arguing that
containment and deterrence was a better policy option than invasion.
The belief the Saddam's past behavior shows he cannot be contained rests
on distorted history and faulty history. In fact, the historical record shows
that the United States can contain Iraq effectively—even if Saddam has
nuclear weapons—just as it contained the Soviet Union during the Cold
War. Regardless of whether Iraq complies with U.N. inspectors or what
the inspectors find, the campaign to wage war against rest on a flimsy
foundation.183

Mearsheimer and Walt repeated these same arguments in February of 2003 in the NY
Times, just one month before the invasion took place.184 In a debate sponsored by the
Council of Foreign Relations, "Iraq: The War Debate", Walt and Mearsheimer argued
against going to war with two prominent neo-conservatives, William Kristol and Max
Boot.185 In this debate, Walt and Measheimer argued that invading Iraq wasn't in the
"national interest" and that Iraq could be contained. The neo-conservatives advanced the
importance of the domino effect, stating that other countries would obtain and pursue
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) if the U.S. failed to remove the WMDs in Iraq and
liberate Iraq from a tyrant. This was one of the first direct clashes between realists and
neo-conservatives and it exposed a clear confrontation between what their core beliefs are
and what assumptions guide their policy prescriptions.
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Perhaps the greatest indictment of how realists and neo-conservatives differ in
their approach to foreign policy prescriptions is their belief that international politics
operates according to "bandwagoning logic."186 According to Mearsheimer, "Realists do
not believe that we live in a bandwagoning world. On the contrary, realists tend to
believe that we live in a balancing world, in which, when one state puts its fist in another
state's face, the target usually does not throw its hands in the air and surrender. Instead, it
looks for ways to defend itself; it balances against the threatening state."187
Mearsheimer maintains that neo-conservatives' belief in promoting democracy by
the use of force also underestimates the impact of nationalism: "[r]ealists, by contrast,
think that nationalism usually makes it terribly costly to invade and occupy countries in
areas like the Middle East. People in the developing countries believe fervently in selfdetermination, which is the essence of nationalism, and they do not like Americans or
Europeans running their lives."188 Scrowcroft, one of the most prominent practitioners of
realism during the George H.W. Bush administration, warned in the Wall Street Journal
that invading Iraq was not in the security interest of the United States and that Saddam
Hussein was already contained.189 The only prominent realist that didn't oppose the US
invasion of Iraq, according to Mearsheimer, was former Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger. According to Kissinger, the attacks of 9/11 created an international condition
that transcended the traditional concepts of the sovereign nation - one of central units of
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analysis of realist theory - and that the use of preventive force to topple the Hussein
regime was the result of this new condition.190
As shown above, realism emphasizes a foreign policy that rejects value-based
foreign interventions and believes that the core beliefs of national interest and
containment must be used to guide the use of military force. In the post-9/11 period, the
realist paradigm can be seen in many ways as a failure to explicate the power of non-state
actors, such as terrorists. In fact, very little in the realist canon focuses on terrorism and
its causes. Most state-centric realists find trouble understanding how the U.S. can declare
a "war on terrorism" against a non-state actor, like al-Qaeda. The 2002 National Security
Strategy points out "traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist
enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents;
whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent protection is
statelessness."191
Without a clear post-Cold War enemy and without holding prominent positions
with the Bush administration, the realists were not well positioned to win the "battle of
minds" following the devastating attacks of September 11. Because realists continued to
view states as the primary actors, the threat of non-state actors such as al-Queda was
absent in much of their analysis and policy strategies. Many realists remained concerned
about what they perceived as the next big threat, China. Therefore, many were unable to
gain influence with their ideas and present a strategy or offer solutions once the "war on
terrorism" pervaded the political discourse after 9/11.
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Liberalism: History, Theory and Practice

In contrast to realists, liberals are not as pessimistic about human nature and the
ability of international institutions to provide a nexus between First and Third World
powers and produce peaceful and prosperous outcomes. Moreover, they view
international institutions as a gateway for curbing the selfish character of states.
Liberalism contrasts with realism in many substantial ways, including its historical
perspective, importance of actors, and foreign policy prescriptions. Liberalism covers a
fairly broad spectrum of analysis and assumptions that include the idealism of Woodrow
Wilson, neo-liberal theories, and the democratic peace thesis. As Snyder makes clear,"
Liberalism has such a powerful presence that the entire U.S. political spectrum, from
neoconservatives to human rights advocates, assumes it as largely self-evident."192
However, many cleavages exist inside the liberal canon.
The liberal tradition in international relations has its roots in the Enlightenment,
with the German philosopher Immanuel Kant and English economist Adam Smith. Its
outlook on international cooperation and war are more optimistic than realism because
they tend to believe in the capacity of reason, rationality, and progress found in the
Enlightenment. Woodrow Wilson and his League of Nations are another expression of
this tradition. In line with Wilson, many liberals contend that strong relations between
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nations can forge a more peaceful world (collective security). Realists, on the other hand,
insist that it is "idealist" and "utopian."193
The core properties in liberalism vary but can be put into workable frameworks.
While they view states as important actors, they also consider international institutions
and regimes—such as the United Nations, World Trade Organization, human rights, and
transnational corporations. Their theoretical underpinnings include the following: 1) a
value-based presupposition to the study of international relations; 2) a belief in the
absolutism of liberal democracies and power of free markets; 3) the importance of human
rights and international law; 4) that economic exchange and international institutions
modify war and promote peace among nations; 5) democracies do not fight one another;
6) multilateralism is a preferred over unilateralism; 7) an ethical foundation based on
joint-gains and the reduction of injustice; and 8) a more cosmopolitan rather than
nationalist worldview.
The role of regimes and international organizations, according to liberals, lead to
a new type of governance that mitigates war and changes the way states interact with one
another. Change in the international system can be produced by internal arrangements
and state behavior (e.g. democracy). Therefore, according to liberals, and in direct
contrast to realists, there are good and bad states. Thus, liberals are making a value-based
judgment on the internal dynamics of each state. This approximation is by no means
monolithic, but should be seen as an amalgamation of beliefs and areas of emphasis that
make it distinct from realism.
Liberalism promotes three ways of thinking about international relations. The first
argues economic interdependence between states will discourage the use of force because
193

Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 15.
69

any warfare would threaten each other's prosperity.194 The second, and more recent,
argues that international institutions and regimes could overcome selfish state behavior
by encouraging states to forgo immediate gains for long-term cooperation.195 The most
recent maintains that state democracies do not engage in warfare with one another.
Therefore, spreading democracy should be the number one security goal (more on this
concept below).196 This theory has heavily influenced debates among scholars and policy
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experts.
In a somewhat similar fashion, Robert Keohane has located three strands of
liberalism that provide strategies for how to seek peace: commercial, regulatory, and
sophisticated.198 Commercial liberalism maintains that the exchange of money, culture,
and ideas get rid of fear among states and undermine war. Hence commerce leads to
peace because it makes war less attractive. Regulatory liberalism holds that if states make
laws, rules, and regulations you won't have war. Sophisticated liberalism believes in a
combination of these two positions. Another theory of liberalism is "complex
interdependence." According to Robert

Keohane and Joseph Nye, complex

interdependence is a form of transnational connections between states and societies that
utilize "multiple channels of interaction" that increase cooperation among states. During
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the 1970s, interdependence theorists noticed an increase in economic relations and a
small decrease in military force as a tool for policy. They held that while military force
was crucial, new means of economic connections could displace—to some extent—the
less preferred policy of military engagement. This idea can be seen as one of the first
steps to bridge the gap between realism and liberalism.
The most debated and widely held conviction of many contemporary liberals is
democratic peace theory. Pioneered in the mid-1980s by Michael Doyle and others, this
theory holds that wars (since 1817) have only been between liberal states and non-liberal
states and that liberal democracies rarely fought one another. This theory pays
considerable attention to the domestic control of nation-states, arguing when elected
leaders are accountable to the people, liberal states will regard each other's regimes as
legitimate and non-threatening. It has been regarded as the closest an IR theory has come
to developing an empirical law. A good example of democratic peace theory entering the
policy realm was in the 1994 State of the Union address by President Clinton when he
said: "Ultimately, the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable peace is
to support the advance of democracy elsewhere. Democracies don't attack each other,
they make better trading partners and partners in diplomacy." In contrast, realists have
always maintained that peace derives from a stable distribution of power among states.
The Clinton administration's foreign policy is one the best examples of the liberal
paradigm surfacing in the post-Cold War period.199 In fact, Mearsheimer has argued that
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the Clinton administration was heavily informed by liberal theories of international
relations:200
Consider how Clinton and company justified expanding the membership
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the mid-1990s.
President Clinton maintained that one of the chief goals of expansion was
"locking in democracy's gains in Central Europe," because "democracies
resolve their differences peacefully." He also argued that the United States
should foster an "open trading system," because "our security is tied to the
stake other nations have in the prosperity of staying free and open and
working with others, not working against them. In the same spirit,
Secretary of State Madeline Albright praised NATO's founders by saying
that "[t]heir basic achievement was to begin the construction of the . . .
network of rule-based institutions and arrangements that keep the peace."
But that achievement is complete," she warned, and "our challenge today
is to finish the post-war construction project. . . [and] expand the area of
the world in which American interests and values will thrive.201
The scholarship and commentary of Joseph Nye, who worked in the Clinton
administration as assistant secretary of defense for international security from 1994-95, is
a good intellectual example of liberal thought being used to conduct foreign policy. More
recently, Nye has distinguished between two types of power relations he calls "hard" and
"soft." Hard power is the ability of a state to use coercion - economic and military might
- to get other states to do what they otherwise would not do. Soft power is the states
capacity to attract other state's to follow because they find your view attractive.202
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During the Clinton administration one of the most revered faiths among neoliberals was the promise of "globalization." As mentioned above, many liberals held that
economic interdependence between countries could prevent conflict and lead to more
democratic states. The best example of this would be U.S. foreign policy toward China
and Russia, with China's admission into the World Trade Organization (WTO), and
Russia following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The best-known public intellectual
who advocated this liberal theory is Thomas Friedman and his golden arches strategy of
conflict prevention. Friedman maintains that no two countries that have a McDonald's
had fought a war against each other.
When a country reached the level of economic development where it had a
middle class big enough to support a McDonald's network, it became a
McDonald's country. And people in McDonald's countries didn't like to
fight wars anymore; they preferred to wait in line for burgers.203
This strategy, with its emphasis on expanding free-market capitalism (e.g. NAFTA) into
all parts of the world to preclude the use of force and to create democratic tendencies,
was a top priority for the Clinton administration during the 1990s.
In the post-9/11 era, the influence of liberalism has been invoked in various and
contentious ways. In terms of neo-liberal arrangements, the Bush administration, in
similar fashion to the Clinton administration, has supported China's entry into the WTO
based in the anticipation that "free markets and integration in to the Western economic
order will create pressures for Chinese political reforms and discourage a belligerent
foreign policy."204 However, more recently, the Bush administration has issued

Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and The Olive Tree (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 2000), 248-275.
G. John Ikenberry/'America's Imperial Ambition," Foreign Affairs, September/October 2002, 51.
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protectionist trade action in steel and agriculture that have "governments ... worried"
about retreat in from the neo-liberal arrangements.205
As discussed above, two of the core beliefs that define liberal internationalism are
democracy promotion and multilateralism. The Bush administration's policy of
promoting democracy as a means to fighting terrorism is perhaps the best example of
liberal ideals surfacing in the post-Cold War era. As Snyder makes clear, 'The White
House's steadfast support for promoting democracy in the Middle East . . .demonstrates
liberalism's emotional and rhetorical power."206 While the invasion of Iraq was
predicated upon democracy promotion, it was carried out unilaterally. Without the
support of international institutions such as the United Nations, liberal support for this
policy was not generated broadly. Most liberals tended to see the "assertive nationalism"
and unilateralism of the Bush administration as a threat to open market stability and
legitimacy of the United States to be an effective global leader.207
Liberalism also holds that using military power to bring about democracy in a
third world country will not only fail, but is undemocratic by nature. As Robert Cooper
expressed:
whereas the principle of equality before the law is basic to democracies,
there is nothing less equal than the invading soldier and the local civilian.
Thus, although a foreign country may invade with the best of intentions
and may bring with it professors of politics to explain democratic theory,
what it does is fundamentally undemocratic. Its words may say the right
things, but its actions tell exactly the opposite story...some things are
beyond the control even of America. Democracy is one of them.
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Democracy means rule by the people, and no one else can make their
choices for them.208
Copper maintains that the invasion of Iraq represents an attempt to combine realism and
liberal internationalism into one strategy, something he calls "imperial liberalism."
However, Copper says that combining the two theories presents great difficulties
historically and empirically. "The balance of power, which calls for the application of
power with calculation and restraint, is no longer sustainable in a democratic age. Nor is
the exercise of hegemony by force—which has been the other source of stability in the
international system. For a democracy, domination by the ruthless use of force ceases to
be an option in the international field just as it has in the domestic."209 Copper also notes
that America's past experiments of promoting democracy in Germany, South Korea and
Japan were very different than using military means to create a democracy in Iraq. "It
should not be surprising in any of these cases that democracy came from within rather
than in the baggage train of a foreign army...You can use force to impose your
'sonnovabitch' but not to impose democratic politics."210
In fact, the unilateral policy of democracy promotion in the Bush administration
was first set forth by neither liberals nor realists, but advanced by the neo-conservatives
during the 1990s. One could concede it was used cynically to garner support for a policy
position whose primary aim was not to promote democracy in the Middle East but to
topple Saddam Hussein and protect Israel.

Robert Cooper, "Liberal Imperialism," The National Interest, Spring 2005
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CONCLUSIONS

The central aim of this thesis was to trace the evolution and influence of neoconservatism over the last four decades and compare it to the two leading frameworks for
interpreting the international order - realism and liberalism. The first chapter revealed
many neo-conservatives viewed neo-conservatism as an idiosyncratic doctrine that lacked
any real meaning. Other neo-conservatives, like Max Boot and Irving Kristol, openly
embraced the term. After discussing how neo-conservatives viewed themselves, Chapters
Two through Four provide the information and context necessary to discover the
tendencies that glued them together as an identifiable group. The final chapter provided a
way to analyze neo-conservative influence in foreign policy by illustrating the differences
between an IR theory and political ideology specifically aiming to change foreign policy.
This included analyzing key components of realism and liberalism and how these two
approaches differ from neo-conservatism in the post-Cold War period.
Two questions were asked at the beginning of this thesis.
1. How does a set of neo-conservative ideas move over time to influence
American foreign policy?
2. How does neo-conservatism compare to realism and liberalism, the two
leading schools of thought in international relations study?

The answers to these questions will be summarized below.
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How does a set of neo-conservative ideas move over time to influence American
foreign policy?

In the 1950s and 1960s the first generation of neo-conservatives was mostly
comprised of public intellectuals, such as Irving Kristol, Norman Podhoretz, and Daniel
Bell. By the 1970s, a generational shift occurred and they began putting their ideas into
practice. This came about when neo-conservatives, such as Richard Perle and Paul
Wolfowitz, began working in the office of Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson. For the first
time, this gave neo-conservatives the unique opportunity and power to advance their
foreign policy ideas both inside and outside of government. However, the height of their
influence would come 30 years later during the administration of George W. Bush.
Over the 20th Century, neo-conservatives developed some common tendencies
that defined them as a group. These include an ardent belief in the use of unilateral
American military power, distain for multilateral institutions such as the United Nations,
Wilsonian ideas of spreading democracy, steadfast support for Israel, and overstated
threat assessments.
The neo-conservative strategy of using unilateral American power to bring about
American security arose after the fall of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the
United States as the only world power. To maintain its "unipolar" world status, neoconservatives advocated American primacy. This, in turn, led them to advocate pulling
back from treaties and international agreements and from seeking approval from
collective bodies such as the United Nations.

Distain for multilateral agreements had been a trademark of neo-conservatism for
over three decades. They strongly opposed strategic arms talks (SALT I & II) with the
Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s and supported President Bush's decision to pull out
of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
Democracy promotion was a second-generation neo-conservative idea that
became a centerpiece of their foreign policy strategy. It developed as a strategy in the
early 1990s to fill the vacuum left by the collapse of communism. Support for Israel is
also a key component of neo-conservatism. Neo-conservatives define America and
Israel's national interest as being one and the same. Their ardent support for Israel can be
traced back to Henry "Scoop" Jackson and in their close ties with Israel and the
formation of think tanks such as JINSA.
The last precept of neo-conservatism is the use of overstated threat assessments.
Since the 1970s, neo-conservatives have repeatedly overstated and exaggerated threats by
U.S. adversaries - whether it was overstating the threat of the Soviet Union or creating
near hysteria about Saddam Hussein's ability to threaten America's security with
weapons of mass destruction. In each of these cases, neo-conservative exaggerations
proved wrong.
How does neo-conservatism compare to realism and liberalism, the two leading
schools of thought in international relations study?

While neo-conservatives gleaned many of their ideas from realism and liberalism,
they differ in many respects. Most fundamentally, neo-conservatism isn't based on a
coherent framework for understanding and interpreting the international order. Neo78

conservatives have not contributed to a specific discipline within IR nor have they
formed a scientific research program from their intellectual assumptions. They are not
theoreticians in the formal sense of the word, nor do they exhibit an acute sense of
positivism or objectivism in evaluating state behavior. Their principle concern is
advancing America's universal values through the use of force.
As shown in Chapter Five, both realism and liberalism produced social science
theories such as balance-of-power and democratic peace theory. Neo-conservatives, on
the other hand, have not put forth a social science theory or theoretical abstraction to
explain state behavior. In contrast to realism and liberalism, which are established in
academic schools, neo-conservatism is a product of intellectual political culture. Because
of this, neo-conservatives have enjoyed a close relationship with high-level government
officials and are more tied into the political and social power structure. This is why many
of the most influential neo-conservatives, such as Albert Wohlstetter, Richard Perle and
Paul Wolfowtiz, are not just thinkers, but "doers."
The historical beginnings of neo-conservatism also differ from realism and
liberalism. While realism and liberalism are based in academia, neo-conservatism began
as an intellectual response to the anti-Vietnam War protests and the breakdown of the
Cold War foreign policy consensus on aggressively "rolling back" communism. From
combating detente in the 1970s to articulating the Bush Doctrine and influencing the
decision to invade Iraq, neo-conservatives promoted their foreign policy strategy by
founding publications and think tanks, forming advocacy coalitions and securing highlevel positions within the Defense and State departments.

Neoconservatism is best understood as a political ideology that is action oriented,
rather than a general theory of state behavior. Whereas realism seeks to explain state
behavior, neo-conservatism seeks to promote the national interests of a particular state the United States of America. From the early 1970s to the administration of George W.
Bush, the principal aim of neo-conservatives has been to implement policy change by
influencing government, building advocacy coalitions and networks, and writing for
media outlets and journals.
But despite their many differences, neo-conservatism shares some similarities
with both realism and liberalism. Table 1 below describes each of these foreign policy
tendencies by examining their core units of analysis, main instruments, core beliefs,
founders, contemporary thinkers and doers of each foreign policy community.

Table 1: Competing Foreign Policy Tendencies
Realists
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Neo-conservatives view foreign policy issues with strict regard for American
primacy and American exceptionalism. While neo-conservatism lacks realism in
assessing the consequences of using force and in its bandwagoning assumptions, it has
some overlap with realism in its focus on military power. It also overlaps with liberalism
in its belief in democracy promotion, but contradicts most strands of liberalism in its
hostility to international law, human rights, and international organization. Unlike
liberals, who generally prefer spreading democracy diplomatically and through
institutions, neo-conservatives maintain that it can be imposed through military force.
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